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Activists on the steps of the U.S. Capitol at a 1990 rally for the Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990
Progeny of the Civi Rights Act of 1964
By Robert D. Dinerstein
Beyer observed more than ten
s Lawrence
Gostin
and Henry
Americans
ago, "the
years
with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the
most important piece of federal legislation since the Civil Rights Act of
1964." IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS
wiTH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS

(1993). The comparison is an apt one,
as the ADA not only rivals the 1964
Civil Rights Act (Act) in importance,
but draws substantially from the structure of that landmark legislation as
well, while extending its antidiscrimination protection to a new class of

huranrights

individuals: people with disabilities.
After several attempts during the
1970s and 1980s to amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to add nondiscrimination on the basis of disability, advocates and lawmakers changed direction
in the mid-1980s to push for a standalone statute that would extend the principle of nondiscrimination to people
with disabilities. Following extensive
hearings, and with broad bipartisan support, Congress enacted the ADA in
1990. The legislation had two primary
antecedents. Substantively, it derived
significant content from section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Struc-

turally, the ADA relied heavily on the
1964 Civil Rights Act, with many of its
titles finding parallels in its precursor.
For example, Title I of the ADA, which
bans employment discrimination by private employers on the basis of disability, parallels Title VII of the Act. Title III
of the ADA, which proscribes discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodations, tracks Title II of
the 1964 Act while expanding upon the
list of public accommodations covered.
Title II of the ADA, which addresses
discrimination in public services, is
based on section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which, in turn, is
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based on Title VI of the 1964 Act.
The connection between the two
statutes is further evidenced by Title I of
the ADA's explicit adoption of the Act's
Title VII enforcement provisions for the
investigation and adjudication of
employment discrimination claims. The
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, created by the 1964 Act,
now has authority to investigate disability complaints as well as those based on
the Act categories, and has promulgated Title I regulations and
important regulatory guidances
interpreting the ADA's employment provisions.
But if the ADA is in many ways
a logical descendant of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, some critical differences between the two statutes
have led to a series ofjudicial interpretations of the ADA that have limited its scope and cut back on its
anticipated protections. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 protects an individual against discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and, in some cases, sex,
without defining these terms and
irrespective of whether the individE
ual is in the minority within the
above categories. In contrast, the
ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual."
No matter how egregious the alleged
discrimination may be, an individual
who cannot satisfy the above definition--especially one who cannot
demonstrate that his or her impairment
is substantially limiting-will not even
be able to challenge the defendant's
actions, let alone prevail on the merits.
To the initial surprise of many experienced legal observers, an extraordinary
number of cases have focused on this
threshold definition, and many courts
have held that individuals with disabilities that the ADA's drafters clearly meant
to cover-for example, diabetes, cancer,
epilepsy, multiple sclerosis-were insufficiently disabled to meet the statutory
definition.
The ADA definition conundrum

Summer 2004

has overshadowed what otherwise
might have been the most significant
difference between the 1964 Act and
the ADA-the nature of discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin as compared to
discrimination on the basis of disability. We assume that the former categories rarely if ever are relevant to the
distribution of societal goods, and thus
ban discrimination outright on these

A 2000 protest against California's
challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court to the
Americans with Disabilities Act

grounds. But disability is sometimes
relevant in ways that race would never
(legitimately) be. Thus, in the workplace, the ADA's protections extend
not to every individual, or even to
every individual with a disability (as
defined above), but instead to a "qualified individual with a disability," who
is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or
desires." While this definition recognizes that a person's disability sometimes precludes employment, the
inclusion of the concept "reasonable

accommodation" in the statutory definition (a term found in the 1964 Act,
but defined much more expansively in
the ADA) is an important recognition
that pure equality of circumstances
insufficiently protects the rights of
people with disabilities.
Supporters and opponents of the
ADA alike predicted upon its passage
that much litigation would focus on the
meaning of such opaque terms as "reasonable accommodation," "undue
hardship" and "fundamental alteration" (the latter two terms being
limitations on the nondiscrimination
requirement), and there has certainly
been substantial litigation in these
areas. But the definitional problem
described above has overwhelmed the
substantive litigation under the
statute, and has highlighted one of the
significant Catch-22s in the ADA: if
an individual is "insufficiently disabled," he or she will not be covered
by the statute, but if he or she is "too
disabled," the individual will not be
qualified for the position in question
(or meet program requirements if
suing under Title II or Ill). As a
result, ADA plaintiffs have been
much less successful than plaintiffs
suing under the 1964 Civil Rights
Act in vindicating their right to live
in a discrimination-free society.
Of course, the differential fate of
civil rights plaintiffs in the courts may
say less about the nature of discrimination than about the tenor of the times in
which we live, and about the consequences of litigating first-impression
statutory claims before a more conservative judiciary. But even if the substantive protections of the ADA have turned
out to be less extensive than many had
hoped, the significant protections the
law has provided, and the powerful
symbolism of a broad-based federal disability antidiscrimination statute, make
the ADA a worthy successor to the
landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Robert D. Dinerstein is professor of
law and associatedean for academic
affairs atAmerican University, Washington College ofLaw.
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